Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Joe Courtney (2nd District of Connecticut)
David Axe’s comment piece on the Aukus security agreement published recently was inaccurate in several respects. I welcome the chance to offer a more accurate account of this extraordinary security agreement.
Last March, when the three heads of government from the US, Australia, and the UK gathered at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego California, they laid out the “Optimal Pathway” to execute Aukus’ goal: strengthen deterrence from Chinese coercion in the Indo-Pacific by accelerated strategic technology sharing amongst the three nations. The centerpiece of this arrangement is the commitment to share nuclear propulsion technology for the Australian Navy’s submarine fleet, which needs recapitalisation. For the US and UK, this amounts to the first such enterprise since 1958, when the US Congress modified its ban on nuclear technology transfer, known as the McMahon Act, to enable the British Navy to build its nuclear-powered submarines.
Axe was correct to note that under the Optimal Pathway, the first Australian built submarines won’t launch until the late 2040s, based on that nation’s underdeveloped submarine industrial base, particularly in the domain of nuclear power. All three countries explicitly recognize that given the age and condition of Australia’s Collins-class submarines, there needs to be a plan to provide Australia with new submarine capability until it is able to build its own boats.
Here’s where Axe loses the thread.
He incorrectly claims that US Virginia-class nuclear subs will be “based” in Australia starting in 2027 as part of the bridge. Wrong. Both US Virginia and British Astute-class submarines will begin regular rotations to Perth, Australia starting in 2024. They will not be “based” there or homeported there, but rather will be doing regular, persistent joint patrols there as part of a new Submarine Force West. The difference is not semantic. These allied submarines are not replacements for the Collins vessels, rather they are a significant undersea force multiplier to the Indo-Pacific region.
Next, Axe got it wrong on the next phase of Aukus, namely the transfer of US Virginia subs to Australia in the early 2030s. He strangely characterized the transfer as a “lease” and, even worse, a “giveaway” which is false. The Optimal Pathway was very clear that the transfer will be a purchase by Canberra, in which the legal title for the submarines will be conveyed to the Australian Navy. These subs will in fact replace decommissioned Collinssubmarines and will operate under Australian command and control as part of its own sovereign fleet not subject to any ownership interest (i.e., lease) by the United States.
Mr Axe might dismiss these two points as mere technicalities, but they display a pattern that undermines the credibility of his third claim, namely that the Aukus transfer of Virginia submarines will result in a zero-sum loss of submarines for the US Navy.
Under this narrative, he asserts that the sale of the US submarines will cause harm to America’s Navy which, today, is below its ideal fleet size. He also cites a low COVID-level production rate of 1.2 submarines per year as further proof that Aukus will aggravate a shortfall in the US undersea fleet. This superficial claim ignores the fact that submarine manufacturing – like all manufacturing across the globe – did suffer a downturn in production caused by the pandemic’s workforce and supply chain disruption from 2019-2022. If he looked closer, however, he would see that in 2022, two Virginia-class submarines were commissioned, USS Oregon and USS Montana; and, in 2023, two more, USS Rickover and USS New Jersey, are slated for commissioning as well.
On top of that, the USS Iowa and USS Massachusetts were christened in 2023 which is the prelude for full launch. New hiring at the primary submarine shipyards in Southern New England and Virginia is brisk and the US Congress has approved historic levels of funding for job training and supply chain development to expand the capacity of the US submarine industrial base, drawing on talent and companies from across the country. In addition, one of the key components of the Aukus plan Axe failed to mention is Australia’s commitment to invest $3 billion into the United States industrial base to further grow production. This funding will also provide a pathway to “skill up” Australian shipbuilders which the country will need so it can take on the highly specialized stewardship of nuclear-powered submarine production.
So, what does all this mean? Will Aukus demand too much from America’s Navy and its industrial base as Mr Axe suggests? Or will it instead be a force multiplier to ensure credible, persistent deterrence in the Indo-Pacific that benefits all three naval forces? I think a closer examination of not just where the Aukus nations are today in 2023, but rather where the Aukus Optimal Pathway plans to go (and already is going) in the next decade emphatically affirms the latter.
Representative Courtney serves as the Ranking Member of the US House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, Co-Chair of the ‘Friends of Australia Caucus’, and Co-Chair of the ‘Aukus Working Group’