Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Gregory W Meeks (5th District of New York)
Washington, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Gregory W. Meeks and Chairman Brian Mast sent a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick on the need for closer cooperation with partners and allies to restrict the People’s Republic of China’s access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
Cosigners of the letter include Bill Huizenga and Sydney Kamlager-Dove, Chair and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, John Moolenaar, Chairman of the House Select Committee on China, as well as Representatives Greg Stanton, Michael Baumgartner, and Johnny Olszewski.
Dear Secretaries Rubio and Lutnick,
Export controls on SME represent one of America’s most significant points of leverage in our strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China. These tools are essential not only for producing the advanced AI chips that will shape the future of both economic and military power, but also for manufacturing the legacy chips that go into PLA weapons systems and intelligence platforms. Maintaining restrictions on this equipment is critical to U.S. national security.
SME controls have also been a bipartisan priority across administrations. The first Trump administration successfully pressed the Netherlands to restrict exports of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography tools to China—a decision that remains the single most consequential chokepoint restriction to date. The Biden administration issued expansive new controls to cover additional equipment categories and solicited additional complementary controls from allies. This continuity reflects a shared recognition across party lines that protecting America’s semiconductor advantage is essential to our national security.
Despite meaningful progress, however, critical gaps persist in our export control regime. Of particular concern, certain foreign-produced chokepoint SME is controlled only for certain specified entities in China, rather than on a countrywide basis. This matters because once equipment crosses the border into China, the U.S. government has extremely limited ability to enforce end-use and end-user restrictions. Verification visits require advance permission from PRC authorities, can take weeks or months to arrange, and are conducted under escort by PRC security personnel. Entity-specific controls, while valuable, cannot substitute for countrywide restrictions on the most critical chokepoint tools.
As documented in the Select Committee on China’s recent bipartisan report, Selling the Forges of the Future, and as highlighted in the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s hearing, “Export Control Loopholes: Chipmaking Tools and their Subcomponents,” China has significantly accelerated imports of foreign-produced chokepoint equipment in recent years. Dutch sales to China of advanced lithography equipment – the most important chokepoint in the supply chain – doubled from 2022 to 2023, and again from 2023 to 2024.Recent reporting from the Financial Times suggests that China is upgrading these imported tools to a level that likely exceeds export control thresholds. Each chokepoint tool that enters China represents a permanent loss of American leverage.
Additionally, China is working to build domestic SME by exploiting access to U.S. and allied subcomponents required to produce tools, such as electrostatic chucks. Left unchecked, China could render U.S. and allied export controls irrelevant by replacing foreign chipmaking tools entirely.
We believe the most effective path forward is vigorous diplomatic engagement with our allies, coupled with clear expectations and timelines. Our allies share our interest in preventing the PRC from achieving semiconductor self-sufficiency, and many have already demonstrated willingness to align with U.S. controls. But time is not on our side.
We urge the Administration to press allies to implement countrywide controls on key chokepoint semiconductor manufacturing equipment and subcomponents: that is, all equipment and subcomponents that China cannot produce indigenously. This engagement should include clear and reasonable deadlines, after which the United States should be prepared to act to close remaining gaps itself if necessary, including by prohibiting the use of U.S.-origin components in the production of chokepoint tools destined to China. We also encourage the Administration to work with allies to restrict servicing of chokepoint equipment countrywide, to the extent feasible, since many chokepoint tools have already reached restricted chipmaking facilities but still require extensive servicing to maintain.
The window to secure America’s semiconductor advantage is narrowing. We request a briefing within the next month on the Administration’s strategy for securing allied cooperation on countrywide controls on chokepoint semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components and the timeline for achieving this goal. We stand ready to work with you on a bipartisan basis to ensure our export control regime and the alliances that support it are equal to this challenge.
Thank you for your attention to this critical national security matter.